Dr. Tun Kyaw Nyein
Dr. Sein Myint
Moethee Zun
Bo Kyaw Nyein
January 2006.
Summary
The paper discusses the political environment in Burma since the 1988 uprising, the policy and rationale of the Burmese military government, and why the opposition’s strategy of dialogue failed. Based upon recognition of political realities, the authors recommend a strategy change to overcome the current political stalemate: multi-party talks between the Burmese military regime and global and regional powers are the only way to open up an avenue, and to encourage the military to seriously pursue a transition to democracy. Negotiations about a new power arrangement, which includes the ethnic nationalities and the Burman opposition groups, will have to take place at the second stage. It is not realistic, to force the military establishment after more than 40 years of military supremacy to relinquish power abruptly. How they get integrated into the transition process will be crucial to the establishment of a new civil-military relationship within a democratic framework.
Introduction
The current compromise of the United Nations Security Council to discuss Burma issues behind the close-door session may appear like a victory for many Burmese activists and a good sound bite for U.S. diplomats. In reality however, it is most unlikely that this move will bring the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) any closer to negotiations, dialogue, or even a compromise solution. It is just as unlikely as the United States’ and EU strategy of sanctions or the “constructive engagement” policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These carrot and stick-policies are based on a misreading of the SPDC Generals.
To bring the SPDC regime to the negotiation table, the International Community has to be realistic and aware of the rationale of ruling Generals and especially of the issues they fear most. It will be necessary to open the route where they can walk confidently without fear for their future. Neither punishing them with sanctions nor coddling them with economic cooperation has been effective. Only a coordinated multilateral effort pursued by the international community -like the six-party talk for North Korea and Afghanistan- remains as an alternative route to easing the gridlock.
In this paper we will first explore the political background, which led to the current situation in Burma, and then discuss a new strategy to address Burma’s problems.
The background
The 1988 uprising: opportunity missed
The pro-democracy uprising in Burma in 1988 is comparable to the Big Bang: Chaos was prevalent and everything was unsettled. During the protest, the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) lost direction, especially when their chairman General Ne Win stepped back, and the military became highly unsure about themselves and their duty. While retreating into the barracks, the administration was mainly left in the hands of the people. In some instances, student leaders like Min Ko Naing and Moe Thee Zun, who were Chairman and General Secretary of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), ran many of the government functions.
It was a most crucial point of time, when U Nu, Burma’s last democratically elected Prime Minister, together with Aung San Suu Kyi, and student leaders could have agreed upon a strategy of concerted action. U Nu attempted to reclaim his legitimacy as Prime Minister of the 1960 elected government. In fact, with U Nu’s government likely to be recognized and backed by the international community, the possibility of reinstalling civilian rule and returning the military to the barracks was only a hair’s breadth away. At this critical juncture, however, the opposition leaders failed to rally behind U Nu and to agree upon a common strategy.
Consequently, the military leaders took advantage of the disunity within the democratic movement, and staged a coup d’etat in September 1988, effectively crushing the democratic protests. There is no doubt that the mastermind of this coup was none other than General Ne Win. But the military regime -calling themselves State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)- was apparently shaken by the uprising and not quite settled at first: it promised to hold elections in 1990 and encouraged the people to form as many political parties as possible, probably to create confusion and “democratic chaos”.
SLORC obviously miscalculated because the NLD won the election in a landslide victory, in spite of the fact that their General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under detention. They refused to hand over power and quickly announced that the task of the elected representatives was to write a Constitution, not to form a government.
Here would have been another opportunity for the opposition inside the country to claim their right and form an elected government as the military regime was back in the saddle, but still lacked resources and support from the people. Yet, two years after the uprising, the democratic opposition forces couldn’t gain further momentum: they found themselves in an “inflationary period” to put it in astronomical terms.
At this point, the Western world started to identify and support Aung San Suu Kyi as the epitome of Burma’s struggle for freedom and democracy.
The phase of consolidation
To stay within astronomical metaphors: like the Universe took shape after the Big Bang, SLORC (later renamed SPDC) started to consolidate its power after the 1990 elections, arresting major opposition leaders and keeping Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. Thousands of people left the country to escape detention and the aggravated living conditions.
Among the major ruling generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, the latter was the most politically astute. As chief of the military intelligence he was the political strategist and decisive for the survival of the military in these trying times. As the military junta was short of foreign exchange, Khin Nyunt’s Military Intelligence not only negotiated with the notorious drug lords Khun Sa and Loei Sit Hun, who were hunted by the Western drug agencies; he also guaranteed them safe sanctuary in Rangoon and, most likely, profited from money laundering. Moreover, he succeeded in reaching ceasefire agreements with several ethnic insurgence groups, who in return got some limited autonomy rights from the Rangoon regime, allowing them to exploit natural resources.
Khin Nyunt also started to take charge of foreign policy issues and created the Office of Special Services (OSS), which included a military think tank. By strengthening the relationship between Rangoon and Beijing, he secured China’s support for the junta. He allowed the Chinese to occupy a military post (most likely a listening post) on some of Burma’s most southern islands in the Andaman Sea, and subsequently used this “Chinese card” to initiate a dialogue with Indian military officers. Since the time of the Independence movement, Indian governments have always been supportive of the Burmese democratic leaders. However, after eight years of courtship and Burma’s growing closeness to China, the Indian government gave in to the demands of its own military officers with their regional security in mind. In passing, the discovery of Natural Gas along Burma’s Arakan coast may have added another incentive to India.
Likewise the Burmese Generals changed their policy towards Thailand. Both countries have had a long and, from time to time, violent history of rivalry; the Thai government had often used Karens and other ethnic insurgency groups as a “buffer” along the common border. Nevertheless, SLORC succeeded in softening the Thai Generals-turned-politicians by offering lucrative business deals. Today, the Thai government ranks as one of the staunchest supporters of the Rangoon regime within ASEAN.
Within a decade the military intelligence’s “Triangulation Plan” was completed: strong trade relations with China, India and ASEAN were established helping to overcome and counterbalance the sanctions imposed by the Western countries. Moreover, with Australia and Japan staying somewhat neutral, Khin Nyunt’s military intelligence ran also a pretty active and successful foreign policy within the extended region. For instance, Korean companies started to actively help the Burmese, especially in the energy sector. With the sale of a nuclear reactor, MIG29s and other military equipments, Russia and Ukraine also found themselves in SLORC’s corner. Many analysts believe that even France has taken a neutral stand, as the French oil giant Total has heavily invested in Burmese gas.
When General Khin Nyunt was finally promoted as Prime Minister in 2003, many of his supporters in the military establishment were running a whispering campaign that this politically astute man was the solution for Burma, even in place of Aung San Suu Kyi. Some ASEAN countries, Western think tanks, academics and Burmese activists bought the idea and banked on the military chief. But with the sudden removal of the military intelligence chief-turned-Prime Minister in October 2004, several supporters lost their shirts and their future and left foreign observers quite helpless.
What comes next in the military?
The removal of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt seemed to indicate a critical change within the SPDC regime, and gave the political opposition and foreign observers some reason for speculation. But without any major political disruption, the military government moved on as usual, even sticking to the original plan for resuming the National Convention without the participation of any significant political party.
After successfully marginalizing all opposition groups during the 1990’s, SPDC unveiled the Seven-Point-Roadmap to Democracy in 2003, thus trying to solve the “legitimacy” issue, which is their major problem since the victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party in the 1990 elections. To overcome this issue, SPDC follows the playbook of General Ne Win, the godfather of present day military dictatorship, who held one-party-elections in 1974 establishing his military rule in civilian guise through the Burma Socialist Program Party.
[2]Similarly, the military rulers are currently planning to transform the mass organization, Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), into a civilian party.
[3] They have recalled the National Convention and intend -probably sometime in 2006- to hold a referendum for the constitution followed by national elections. Ethnic groups who are also known as “ceasefire groups” for coming to terms with the military regime, are supposed to participate in the upcoming elections to give the impression of a multi-party, multi-ethnic vote. It goes without saying that most ruling Generals will be elected. And by staging an election and a new constitution in hand, they might be able to reinvent and transform themselves into “legitimate” military rulers in civilian garb.
The final scenario is conceivable: once the NLD-“legitimacy” derived from the 1990 elections is overwritten by new elections, it will be much easier for SPDC to showcase their “legitimacy”. Moreover, with time, the elected representatives from 1990 -many of them of old age- will pass away one by one, and with another election cycle, most of them will be forgotten, as it happened to Prime Minister U Nu’s elected government of 1960.
What about the opposition? (Or: What is the strategy of the opposition?)
The situation of the opposition within Burma is more than dreary. With Aung San Suu Kyi, the icon of the democratic movement under house arrest for more than ten of the last seventeen years of SLORC/SPDC rule, the Burmese democratic forces are wandering in political wilderness. Their members are either in detention or get constantly harassed and neutralized by the military intelligence.
The current ruling Generals have learned from Ne Win, who was not only a power-hungry General, but also a skillful and seasoned politician. Following his model, SPDC Generals systematically arrested all capable leaders and sentenced them to long-term imprisonments to detach leaders from the followers. Next, they broke the strength of the followers by constantly harassing them and squeezing out all opportunities for their survival. After some time, the opposition lost their critical political infrastructure and organization to wage an effective strategy. After 16 years of military suppression, NLD, the main opposition party, is struggling with no effective organization power. When Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, famous leaders of the 1988 uprising, were released from prison in 2004 after 16 years of detention, they found most of their former student comrades scattered across the globe without any organization structure.
Outside the country the situation is just as bleak. None of the exile organizations have any strength, significant following or a plan to launch an effective opposition campaign. After 16 years of self-destructive mismanagement, the National Coalition Government of Union of Burma (NCGUB) has basically become a five-member NGO dependent on political welfare of the donor community. They spend their time attending conferences and writing plan after plan how to build capacity and run the government if and when Burma embraces democracy, but without a strategy how to achieve it.
The Federation of Trade Unions–Burma (FTUB) and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) can still give some heartburn to the military generals but none of these organizations is well organized or well funded to effectively change the existing stratocratic system.
Thus, while the military is adapting to a changing environment and challenges, and has an obviously well-defined plan to legitimize and prolong their rule, the opposition forces are weak, surviving mainly around Aung San Suu Kyi, and not able to adapt to any changes. Moreover, the opposition is pursuing the same strategy for now 15 years without any progress: By asking the military regime to enter into dialogue while clinging to their claim of legitimacy derived from the 1990 election.
Looking back, the NLD leadership formed a policy to ask for a dialogue with SLORC while Western democracies exerted pressure on the military junta through sanctions. For the moment, sanctions seemed to take effect, as the military rulers were still struggling for their survival. In 1994, and then again in 2001 and 2002 they agreed on talks with the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Whether it was a ploy or a genuine misunderstanding between the two parties (no one knows with certainty), anyhow, the military retreated after May 2002 and never returned for a dialogue.
Today the military junta has skillfully implemented their strategy and succeeded in actively building relationships with their neighbors and Asian trading partners. Most of the exiled opposition leaders are therefore quick to blame China, India and ASEAN for supporting SPDC, not understanding that all nations act first in their own self-interest in any decision making process.
In short, in the current political situation –with a weak opposition and good regional relations- the ruling generals have no incentive or desire to come to the negotiation table for a dialogue with NLD.
A new approach [or: A strategy change]
Looking at the rationale of the military regime
First, it is important to understand the rationale of the ruling military and to have a look at the historic-cultural background of their “collective thinking”. Their ideology and nationalist mind-set is molded by the experience of British colonial rule, the anti-colonial struggle, and the widespread ethnic and communist insurgencies after reaching independence, and the intervention of Chinese Nationalist KMT troops in Northeastern Burma (with the support of the CIA). It is very easy to provoke xenophobic and nationalist feelings in the Burmese military, as the idea that the Army is the only force since the Independence Struggle sixty years ago to prevent the country from disintegration and selfish foreign interests, is at the core of their identity.
Consequently, the imposed sanctions and political demands from the western democracies are conceived of as insult and threat to national sovereignty. Moreover, as they regard NLD and its General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi responsible for this, they disdain her with the same passion, as she is supported and worshiped in the democratic movement and by the Western public for her courage and steadfast struggle for democracy. Related to this perceived threat from outside and watching Iraq, the SPDC seemed concerned that Burma could be the next military target of the United States, although the facts and logic may not support such military adventures. However, using millions of dollars in building bunkers close to the mountains and the recent moving of the military headquarter from Rangoon to Pyinmana in central Burma, could be seen as indication that the Generals are taking a foreign attack quite seriously.
Another and probably major reason for the Generals’ reluctance to share or relinquish power is the fear of facing an international criminal trial. The images of Slobodan Milosovic standing trial in The Hague in front of an International Criminal Tribunal, and the recent Saddam Hussein trial, have definitely chilling effects on the junta. They are anticipating that Aung San Suu Kyi once she is in power, will not only search for criminal persecution, but also destroy the livelihood of the whole military establishment.
[4] Instead, the Generals have already made quite clear how they conceive of their role in future Burma under a new constitution. They want their livelihood, their interests to be protected and demand a decisive role in the building, developing, and governing of the nation: 25% of all seats have to be reserved for military officers in both the state and national parliament, and the President has to have military experience.
Therefore, if the only demand and priority of the opposition and the Western governments is for SPDC to enter into a dialogue and negotiate with Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta will ignore it as it has always done and continue their rule at all cost.
Looking at the options of the international community
Given the above-described rationale of the military, the current efforts at United Nations Security Council to discuss the Burma’s issue may be a good move at the tactical level, just to bring the issue back to the forefront. But it is not a winning strategy for a long lasting solution. It may also evoke false hopes for many Burmese, that the United Nations will save the country, and worse, it could instill the idea among the Burmese opposition inside Burma that Democracy will simply fall into their laps. It is almost certain that the SPDC Generals will not cave in to demands of the United Nations led by the United States, but instead relying on support from United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Veto-Powers like Russia and China.
Although the opposite impression is somehow prevalent in the public discourse, the SPDC Generals are no fools with regard to international- and geo-politics. In addition to their well-established relations to China, the Generals are quietly building their relationship with the Kremlin not only to counter their dependency on China, but also to ask for help from Russia, if needed for instance in the UNSC. Business announcements are expected in a few months, which will reveal their growing relationship with Russia.
Even if the United States could overcome a possible veto by China and Russia in the UNSC and reach a resolution calling for Aung San Suu Kyis release and demanding SPDC to negotiate with NLD, SPDC will certainly refuse because of all the above-mentioned reasons, and their sense of pride and nationalism. The scenario, which would follow is easy to anticipate: the UN would be forced to impose sanctions. Knowing from the Iraq experience, SPDC generals would probably try to bribe with their Natural gas, and there are some people who are always willing to help by-pass sanctions. There would be a long tug-of-war, which the innocent population would have to bear, while the Generals retain their wealth and power. It would describe another dark age for the Burmese, suffering under Generals, who stubbornly resist sanctions and outside pressure.
Except for military intervention, there is no clear solution deriving from the United Nations Security Council. However, with Iraq war dragging, continuous and more severe nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea, and a Global Islamic terrorism, it is doubtful that the United States will consider a military invasion, especially as the Burma regime poses no clear and present danger to America.
China, on the other hand, could offer one avenue for a realistic approach. One of the key strategies of the current Chinese policy is to focus on development and economic stability in the region. It is gradually transforming from a big brother bully to a civilized nation interested in regional development projects and good economic relations with the regional neighbors. For example, taking a leading role in the Mekong project and the change of heart in the Spratly Islands dispute was China’s debut in influencing its neighbors through peace and development rather than flexing its military and economic muscles. Currently many Chinese officials are frustrated because it seems that the Burmese are the only one among the regional partners who do not comply with the project goals.
Beijing is fully aware that Burma with its erratic Generals and the constantly suppressed people is a time bomb. They want to avoid a repeat of the 1988 uprising, which would attract more international anger, damage their image as a supporter of the regime, and, most importantly, jeopardize regional political and economic stability. For that reason it is in their interest to cooperate with regional partners and the United States to find a solution for Burma.
How to encounter the military and to pave way for multi-party talks
Against this background and given the difficult reality in Burma’s current political situation, the United States has to keep the lead in its effort to bring a genuine solution for the country. Instead of only demanding SPDC to come to a dialogue with NLD, the United States should initiate multi-lateral talks with China as leading co-partner and include other international allies and regional powers like India, Russia, Japan, ASEAN and EU. The North Korea six-party talk could serve as a model. By welcoming China as a leading co-partner and bringing in the regional powers and allies, the United States invites to solve the thorny issue together and thus promotes multilateral policies rather than pursuing unilateral interests. In addition, if Thailand’s attempt to restart the Bangkok process should succeed, America- and China-led seven-party talks could serve as continuation of the Bangkok process.
The most difficult part, however, will be to convince the Burmese Generals to take part in negotiations in an American-led international forum in the first place. What could induce them to participate in talks, which will address no less than their own future? It is tempting at this point to invoke Thucydides who said, nations were motivated by only three things: fear, pride, and self-interest. After being shunned by the U.S. and Western nations for over a decade, it is likely that the Burmese Generals will welcome an opportunity to participate in talks on an international level having their injured pride assuaged and with a reasonable comfort zone provided by the presence of friendly regional powers such as China and India. Another incentive for the Generals would be a chance to make their case to the multilateral parties without having to sustain a unilateral and moralistic lecturing from the U.S. and other Western democracies. Last but not least, one of the most important issues for the Generals before even starting the talks will be to guarantee them, not to be indicted in the International Criminal Court. This guarantee will allay their fears and will be crucial for the ruling Generals to come to the negotiation table and to search for a genuine solution for Burma.>[5]
The talks: a short outline
The initial stage will start with multi-lateral talks between SPDC, United States, China, ASEAN, India, Russia, EU and Japan. The goal of the first phase is to bring the SPDC Generals to the negotiation table. The key factor will be to give assurances to the Generals that they will not face prosecution at the International Criminal Court with the proviso that this assurance can and will be withdrawn if SPDC do not implement or follow agreements obtain from these talks. The goal of this stage will be to establish confidence-building and general discussion on a framework for a new civil-military- relationship within which both, the military and opposition groups can work together and participate in the political process.
In a second phase the Burman and ethnic opposition will be included. This allegedly subordinated position of the opposition seems crucial, given the fact that the deep resentments of the Generals towards Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have been the main reason given for the current stalemate. Equally it is decisive in this phase that the international community and negotiating partners refrain from defining the Burmese opposition exclusively as NLD. The Burmese opposition has to include beside the NLD, ethnic representatives, the student leaders of 1988, such as Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi, and other seasoned Burmese politicians. This certainly does not mean that Aung San Suu Kyi’s role is diminished. The first and ultimate goal however, is to halt and slowly sunset the military dictatorship in Burma and to pave way for democracy in Burma. Therefore, as will be shown later, Aung San Suu Kyi will play the crucial role in the following, third stage of the negotiation- and transformation-process.
It is essential at this stage that all agreements be defined clearly, recorded and signed by the agreeing parties. During the short talks between NLD and SLORC, there seemed to be no written agreement and without the written record of the discussions they were is open to misinterpretation and understanding and even abuse.
The third stage will deal with the future constitution of Burma and the shape of the multi-ethnic state. While the first and second stage are determined by building confidence and general discussions -on how to handle the transition, the political participation of different political groups within the process, handling law and order and economic issues- the constitution writing process will be the most complex one. It touches the most sensitive issues in Burma politics: the role of the military in future Burma and the shape of the multi-ethnic state. It should be noted here, that since 1962 coup d’etat, the endeavors for more autonomy of some ethnic groups and the “threat of disintegration” of Burma was always the most effective and convincing explanation used by the military to justify their rule.[6]
The first inter-ethnic agreement signed in Panglong 1947 was designed in a hurry and was not comprehensive. It did not cover all the major issues concerning Burma’s ethnic composition and problems. Meanwhile, some ethnic groups have been trying to write a constitution in exile for more than 10 years with the help of some Western governments and scholars. As they cannot be considered of being legitimate representatives, and their idea is based on an 8-states-model instead of the current 14 states in Burma, these proposals will be definitely a non-starter for many Burmese. The country is desperately in need of a comprehensive look at the multi-ethnic issues, autonomy rights, rights of the states versus national (or federal) entity etc., and has to find a constitutional solution which is fair and balanced for both, the Burmese majority and the ethnic minority groups.
Thus the Burma Constitution problem is the utmost complex, sensitive, and explosive issue. At this stage of moulding the constitution for a multi-ethnic state, Aung San Suu Kyi will have to step in. The situation needs the eloquent persuasion of a leader of her status, posture and credibility to overcome mistrust and misunderstanding. As the daughter of Aung San, she epitomizes political morality and enjoys the respect and acceptance of both, the Burmans and ethnic groups. Only she will be able to walk the last mile to unite the people, and like her father, to transcend the whole nation.
Prospects for the transition phase: a wish list
Rebuilding the nation
To rebuild the nation is a gigantic task, which no single group alone can accomplish. Neither the military nor the opposition possesses the capacity to administer and oversee the restoration of the country with effectiveness and free of corruption. One of the basic issues in the restoration process will be to avoid corruption, which makes it necessary to separate “politics” from “administration”. The best strategy to achieve this goal is to put the administration strictly in the hands of “professionals” or “technocrats” during the transition period, while politicians, political leaders and operatives are sorting out the crucial issues related to the Constitution process.
Due to the total domination of military officials in every corner of governance and society many young professionals have left Burma to seek better opportunities and are scattered all over the globe. Many are now well established in their chosen professions. Most of these professionals and technocrats have gained valuable experiences. They are well trained, and have mastered global standards and practicing in modern corporate world. Many are still emotionally attached to the motherland. If they are given a chance, many of these seasoned professionals and technocrats will return to help rebuild the country. These Western trained professionals will become the core and driving force not only in rebuilding the country they can be vital in educating and promoting Democracy in Burma.
[7]Certainly, the selection process of choosing able technocrats from the pool of professionals will be a challenge in order to satisfy both sides. There is already a team of well-known intellects, technicians and professionals formed to contribute in their respective fields called Technical Advisory Network (TAN) from the exile side. Also, there are many capable experienced hands from the military side who had been retired, removed or sidelined because they did not fall into military orders such as Brig generals Abel and Zaw Tun and there are many well-qualified civilian technocrats currently serving in the government. TAN can be expanded to become a Joint Military-Civilian Selection Committee to choose the “best and the brightest” to form the core of the Transition Government.
The separation of politics from day-to-day governance must be implemented down to the State levels, and there must be an effort to put the local issues and developments in the hands of local technocrats to encourage autonomy, responsibility and accountability. There are many young, experienced and talented professionals from ethnic groups who are educated and trained in developed countries. They should be encouraged to take part in the development of the country and the Union states.
The shape and model of a technocrats’ government
The Burmese military is currently in total domination of the society. Therefore, it will be a sensitive and difficult issue to convince the generals to give up their positions, which are their source for income and corruption. Even if an agreement can be reached, the military will demand for the Defense and Home (Interior) portfolio. Without their control over national security issues the generals will not agree to any change in the government. The composition of technocrats in the government could therefore include ex-military ministers who have shown efficiency, capacity and credibility.
Another important aspect will be to distribute the policing to localities instead of keeping it centralized.
The international negotiation partners have to be prepared to solve the currency problem (Burma’s currency is “kyat”), and to offer programs that the technocrats can implement to reinvent the economy. A plan should include the reengagement of international financial institutions but with responsibility and accountability given to credible leaders at the head of the ministries. Because of the uncertainty of the direction during the negotiation with the SPDC generals, only the skeleton of the shape and architecture is proposed for discussion. Details are deliberately left out to provide flexibility and maneuverable space for future discussions: Forms shall follow functions.
Because of the basic suspicious nature of the ruling generals, it is recommended that a blue ribbon council of elder statesmen, ex-military generals, politicians and distinguished citizens supported by international experts should take a look at the direction and shape of some important ministries such as defense, agriculture and industry. They will then be able to give guidelines and set expectations to the technocrats who will be leading these ministries. Moreover, United States government should bring in Wall Street specialists, Capital market professionals and Venture Capitalists (if possible) to encourage private investment in the future of Burma.
The energy sector should be one of the focus area with special attention paid to LNG (Liquidified Natural Gas) technology and New Chemical Processing techniques such as producing gasoline from Natural gas (Burma may be able to export gasoline cheaper than other producers). This move will satisfy the Burmese generals and will help build the Burmese private sector as well as the Burmese business community with knowledge of global standard.
The role of military during the transition period
With the guarantee not to get indicted, it is possible that the head of state could be a General. The members of the seven-party talk could consider the replacement of
General Than Shwe with General Maung Aye as head of state during the transition period. It is widely known that Than Shwe has an extremely negative attitude towards NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in particular, and many young Generals are displeased with his eccentric manners that made him think of himself as an Emperor. As there is a genuine power struggle going on between Maung Aye and Than Shwe, the talks may favor Maung Aye to ask for Than Shwe’s retirement within the ruling clique. Some local analysts believe that Maung Aye is more pragmatic and reasonable in dealing with the opposition, especially with Aung San Suu Kyi.
SPDC favors the Indonesian model where the military controls 25% of the parliament or any legislative body so that they will have veto power to stop any law that will prosecute them for the crimes they may have committed during their absolute military rule. If some form of amnesty can be worked out with a “truth and reconciliation committees” formed in accordance to the model of South Africa, it will take the “fear” out of the military officials.
Still, the military may seek some oversight mechanism before relinquishing their total control. It is quite conceivable that the military may want some control over the transition government run by technocrats. Burma could look at the Turkish model where the elected civilian government leaders met with the military brass regularly to get the consent of the military particularly on matters concerning with National Security issues through National Security Council, led by a four star general. Recognizing that the military regime has never demonstrated competence to manage any sector of government, this mechanism of semi-oversight by the military over civilian government through National Security Council shall exist only as a procedural, face-saving tactic during the transition period and shall have a sunset clause once the Constitution is complete, ratified and representative constitution is implemented.
Who will control the military budget during the transition?
One of the biggest hurdles will be the control of the military budget. The military elite is accustomed to an “Open Budget Cycle” for the military budget due to their absolute control of power. This preference of military budget is also one of the main reasons for the economic failure the country is facing at present time. A “Military council” as practiced in China can be the model to control the military budget. The members should be elder statesmen with long military experiences and senior members of the cabinet. The military council should not only consider the military budget but also approve the military planning and preparedness. It should reexamine the size and force structure relative to the threats the country is facing and should based on economic strength and viabilities. There should be a balance between what the country can afford to meet the realistic national security needs and the wish list of the military brass. There is no shortage of experienced old hands and social-military experts in Burma to take positions in this council. Under no circumstances should the military have budgetary authority to decide its allocation of the national budget.
If the talks fail and the military cheats
It may be that a dictatorial regime plans to cheat or slows down the transition process. North Korea is an example. It should be clear from the start that the guarantee to abstain from prosecution depends on the willingness and the progress of the Generals to implement the agreement reached between SPDC and the opposition. It should be clear that if SPDC started to dishonor their agreements signed with the opposition, recognized by the International Community, the guarantee from prosecution shall and can be withdrawn and United States shall take a lead in submitting Burma’s case to United Nations Security Council to be followed by UN sponsored International sanctions.
Also, U. S. should develop a plan to invite Burmese opposition leaders in exile with the aim to form a United Front in the form of Burma Congress in exile. For 15 years, United States has been focused only on organizations and people who claim to represent NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Many of them are inefficient, bureaucratic operatives who don’t know how to organize or lead a movement. They have become totally reliant upon the donor community for their survival. In accordance with a new strategic approach, United States should look beyond these named opposition groups. Moreover, the U.S. should attempt to expand their help to reach the population inside Burma through other exiled organizations.
One of the critical events that SPDC is always afraid to face is the threat of another national uprising like 1988. While the negotiations are moving ahead and if some political space becomes open, these newly energized exile groups can meet and re-connect with their supporters inside Burma. These groups will become democracy- operatives and workers during future election campaigns. Should the negotiations stall and SPDC start to cheat the process, they can easily move underground and provoke strikes and demonstrations, which could lead to another national uprising.
As an insurance policy, U.S. should have a plan to groom and build the opposition operatives both inside the country and in exile.
Conclusion
It will be a difficult road to Democracy for a country like Burma where a dictatorial culture and a military mind-set have ruled the country for nearly half a century. The worst Ne Win has left, as his legacy is a mind-set where corruption, self-centricity and living for survival became the norm. Ma-lho-te ma-shoat ma-pytoe -no movement, no interference, and no losing (of jobs)- became the slogan. Both, the NLD opposition and the ruling SPDC elite, are unknowingly surviving according to this mentality, and nothing gets done for the country. Even the opposition living in exile is still influenced by this mentality. Although many so-called activists are shouting for Democracy, they do not know how to handle opposite views with tolerance and understanding. There is a long road ahead for Burma. But even with all these difficulties, gradually we will reach our goal for freedom and a democratic society.
The alternative is bleak: the military junta is building a society where they are controlling every aspect. Burma is marching towards a Sparta-like society where education, high-level jobs, business opportunities are reserved only for the military establishment, their families and cronies.
Teachers are promoting students without teaching but are giving private tutoring after schools, bureaucrats are asking for bribes openly, and even doctors have to be bribed to do a surgery. The military elite has special schools for their families and have now built special professional universities attached to military academies for medicine, engineering and computer science. Usually, the military recruited the professionals after graduation, but now the military has taken awaythe best resources (professors and equipments) from the civil universities and moved them to military academies, leaving the public universities under civilian administration to shambles.
The opposition has been marginalized, and Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, with her age and health declining, will become another Dalai Lama: a beloved icon and leader but without any political power to free her country. If she passes away from the scene, the opposition within the country without any upcoming leaders in the second row, and the so-called exile leaders in total disarray, the voices for opposition will fade away.
So, what are we fighting for? If the goal is to free Burma from the yoke of military dictatorship, we should focus on achieving DEMOCRACY. The military is guarding the entrance to the door, and after fifteen years of failed hope for dialogue and a never ending stalemate, this paper tried to outline a new strategy how to pass through the gate: by negotiation with the Generals based on “interest” rather than “emotions” and with the assistance from global and regional powers. It is still possible to achieve peace, development and democracy but only with the help and full commitment of the international community. The most precious gift the United States can offer to the world is the export of freedom and democracy. To use the words of Aung San Suu Kyi: Please use your freedom to help us.
Authors
Dr. Tun Kyaw Nyein is a Burma activist since the 70’s and member of the Strategy Group for Burma, a Burmese think tank. As one of the leaders in the pro-democracy U Thant-uprisings in 1974, he got imprisoned in Insein jail for nearly 5 years, and finally left Burma in 1983. Dr. Tun Kyaw Nyein, an Acting Dean at the University College of the North Carolina Central University, received his medical degree M.B.B.S. from Rangoon Medical College and his Ph.D. from University of Tennessee, Knoxville, U.S.A. He is the son of U Kyaw Nyein, one of the leaders of the Burma independence movement, who became Deputy Prime Minister in the U Nu government.
Dr. Sein Myint is a member of Strategy Group for Burma and Technical Advisory Network (TAN), a team of Burmese intellectuals. He also serves as Director for Justice for Human Rights in Burma (JHB) and as a member of Board of Director for Burma Fund, the financial arm of NCGUB. Dr. Sein Myint received his engineering degree from Rangoon Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. from Manchester, United Kingdom. He is Vice President for Engineering at Marioff Inc. in Maryland.
Moethee Zun became famous as one of the top student leaders in the 1988 democratic uprising in Burma. He was General Secretary of All Burma Students Union (ABSU), known since the independence movement as the powerhouse in Burmese politics. After leaving Burma to escape arrest, he became the Chairman of the All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) for nearly ten years. Moe Thee Zun is also the founder and President of Democratic Forces of Burma (DFB) and member of Strategy Group for Burma. He received his Bachelor degree in Physics from the Rangoon University and his Master of International Affairs in Public Policy from Columbia University, New York.
Bo Kyaw Nyein has written several articles and position papers on Burma’s politics, many of them posted at Mizzima, Burmese affairs website and news center. Like the co-authors, he is a member of Strategy Group for Burma. Bo Kyaw Nyein is the youngest son of U Kyaw Nyein and was imprisoned for nearly five years for his leadership in the U Thant uprising in 1974 along with his brother. He received his engineering degree from Rangoon Institute of Technology and his M.S. from Western Illinois University, U.S.A. He served as an engineering professional and manager in several Fortune 100 companies such as Unisys, HP and Cisco.
[1]In 1947 Nehru had promised General Aung San not to allow the use of Indian troops in Burma if the negotiations between the Burmese and the British delegation on Burma’s independence would fail. During the civil war in the 1950s, India came to help the U Nu government by sending arms, when both the Western democracies and the Communists refused their support. After the coup d’etat of Ne Win in 1962, the Indian government was siding with the Burmese democrats who fought against the military regime.
[2] After staging the coup d’etat in 1962 and heading the Revolutionary Council for a decade, Ne Win ordered the writing of a new constitution and formed the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). One-party-election were finally held in 1974 and won by the BSPP with over 90% of the votes. This marked the beginning of the one-party dictatorial rule that lasted until the uprising in 1988.
[3] Formed in 1993 as a non-governmental association and affiliated with the Burmese Red Cross, the Women’s Affairs Committee, military-backed welfare groups and retired military members, it is assumed that USDA includes 12 million people across Burma. Senior General Than Shwe, chairman of SPDC, is the patron of the organization.
[4] It is not quite clear, why the military is so strongly convinced that Aung San Suu Kyi’s wants to put them on trail, as she repeatedly mentioned, not to seek revenge. On the other hand, suggestive statements about the regime of Aung San Suu Kyi like: “…Because what they are doing is against the law. According to the terms of the law, some of the things they have done are crimes. So they are criminal activities” or “Let me put it this way. The majority of Burmese leaders today are extremely rich. Twelve years ago they were not at all well off. Let that be an indication” (see quotes of Aung San Suu Kyi on the official website http://www.dassk.org/), may have fostered their conviction.
[5] Although it is more than understandable that most people in the opposition yearn for revenge and justice, after living under military rule for nearly half a century and experiencing repeated abuses, the Burmese will have to accept the fact, that the military regime holds governance powers, and that there will be no peace and development in a foreseeable future without the military at the negotiation table. It will be hard for many Burmese to swallow, but it should be the price the people have to pay to attain freedom for 52 millions Burmese.
[6] Burma has several major ethnic and several hundreds sub-ethnic groups. During colonial rule, the British installed a “divide et impera” policy by keeping “Ministerial Burma” (mainly ethnic Burmans) and the “Border areas” (inhabited mainly by minority groups) separated. To demonstrate “national unity” towards the British became the main issue of the independence movement led by General Aung San. He finally signed the famous Panglong treatment together with some of the major ethnic leaders, a precondition for the 1947 Constitution. In Panglong, Aung San agreed on the demand from the Shan leaders that the Shan and Karenni have the rights to secede from the Union of Burma after 10 years (similar to what Kurds are demanding in Iraq today). When the Shan in 1962 called a meeting to discus this specific clause, Ne Win took this event as cause to stage a coup d’etat. He justified his violent takeover with the explanation that he had to save the country from disintegration.
[7] With time, younger generations of Burmese who are born and raised in foreign countries will lose their emotional attachment and cultural touch with Burma. If we fail to utilize these generations of seasoned and well-trained professionals for Burma in rebuilding and redevelopment, it will be a great loss for the country.
Rethinking the Burma Strategy (A new approach)
Let’s Open the Freedom Gate, TOGETHER
By Bo Kyaw NyeinMizzima News (www.mizzima.com)
What Next?
It is surely good news to hear and watch the current developments in the opposition camp forming coalitions or alliances among Burmese opposition groups. But some wonder what is the goal and have they really thought it through and how will they meet the goal once they are defined properly. Thus, the question, what next?
This same question has been asked to many of the opposition leaders, and has received several different answers. I just want to share my thinking, because in my humble opinion, we are at the critical crossroad. If we have clear and realistic goals and plans, if we can visualize the end game, if we can form UNITY, and if we can execute it in a practical manner, we have a strong chance to walk the last mile and close the ugly chapter of the military dictatorial rule in our beloved home land of Burma.
Is Reconciliation still possible?
There are some in the opposition camp who still believe that there is still a chance for reconciliation and hope that there will be a place for them. When DASSK was released last year we all had a slight hope that there might be a chance for unity talks but soon all the hopes got dimmer, as we can clearly see the techniques the SPDC were using were the same old techniques they had learned from their deposed mentor, their ‘A-Phay-Gyi’ Ne Win. After the Depayin incident, we are back to square one and their ‘Bilu’ Head has been exposed. So it should be crystal clear that SPDC has no intention to relax their tight dictatorial rule or to share power with DASSK, or to allow free elections in Burma.
Ne Win Legacy
When Ne Win staged a coup d’etat in 1962, his sole ambition was to seize power for himself. He used the army, an established institution, and immediately practiced military dictatorship to fulfill his ambition. Next, he stole the word ‘Socialism’ so that he could use the tool of the dictatorship to suppress the opposition and destroy the democratic institutions in the name of building a ‘Socialist Society’. Then, he tried to legitimize the military rule by dropping their green army uniform and transforming themselves into civilian politicians. By creating the BSPP party and rewriting the constitution, Ne Win was trying to legitimize his illigimate rule and, at the same time, was trying to create a political system that would support him. Because his power base came from the military institution, Ne Win established the system that puts military officers as a ruling class. The ugly legacy of Ne Win is that he institutionalized the Military Dictatorship where the whole population is forced to support the military to enrich themselves. It is nothing short of “Domestic Slavery”
Like every dictatorial system, the base of support comes from placing the supporters in key positions. Starting from Ne Win, through all successive military governments, up to present day SPDC, the most critical key support lies with the military commanders in the field. Regimental commanders during Ne Win time and now the LIDs commanders and Military Regional commanders for SPDC. Their line of succession starts from regimental commanders to LID commanders to military region commanders right up to SPDC members. Then they rotate themselves between different government ministries to enrich themselves. Every commanding positions and every governmental positions are just rewards for being “LOYAL”.
That is the reason why corruption is basically the way of life in Burma like in every dictatorship. Corruption is the means to pay for loyalty. If one carefully study the process of Burma military dictatorship there has been no progress and it has comes around the whole circle. It starts with Ne Win’s single rule, and then changing to BSPP in a civilian form, then back to military junta. The consolidation of power by Than Shwe is almost complete and we are marching towards another strong man era. It should be very clear to everyone that the structure of the military rule is still the same, only the name of the ruling council changes.
Many among the Burmese and some foreign scholars had suggested that there are moderate elements in the Burmese army and they are hoping against hope that they will save the country from the hard-line Generals. I see it differently. Like in every organization there are several groups within the Burmese military. In my view, essentially there are 3 elements within the military: Intelligence, fighting forces and administration. The armed forces, which comprises of regiments, LIDs and Regional Commanders are the main backbone or the body of the military. Intelligence plays 3 parts: maintaining control of the population, finding money for the military through drug connections and fending off foreign pressure. OSS officers are supposedly more educated, have more exposure to Western world and have ‘WORLD VIEW’, and thus some like to think of them as ‘moderates’. In reality they are the part of the whole. They are all playing their role. Government is the bureaucratic arm of the military to implement the set policies. The only thing that can be said is that after Saw Maung was eliminated and Than Shwe was promoted, there was a power gap and Khin Nyunt played a special role, compared to his counterparts in other dictatorship systems. For example, Beria’s sole responsibility was to search for and destroy all the enemies of Stalin. Just like “one and a half” Tin Oo who played the exact role for Ne Win. Khin Nyunt has extra duties in setting policies in addition to his intelligence chief role. Nothing more.
When Than Shwe became the head of the military, most of the people who were in the key positions were not his appointees. They were all Ne Win appointees. It took Than Shwe nearly 14 years to fill many of these key positions with his loyal followers. Than Shwe may not have a worldview, or intellectual capacity, but he is very street smart in my opinion. He took advantage of the rivalry between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt and slowly filled the key military positions with his followers. Another known fact about the Military Intelligence is that they are unpopular and mistrustful by their fellow officers. So without a proper political infrastructure, it is very hard for the Intelligence chief to grab power. Andropov became the SG of the Soviet Communist party when he used the KGB power base to capitulate himself to become the political boss. But there was a Communist party as a proper political infrastructure. The only time that an intelligence chief could grab power in the military dictatorship was in Greece in the 1960s when the Greek intelligence chief Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Ioannides, became defacto head of the Greek military junta. Khin Nyunt is unlikely to betray his fellow officers simply because he has no power base outside the MIS and is personally despised by fellow officers.
What Options do we have?
So we now need to ask what options we have.There are three options:1. Armed Revolution2. Evolutional Transition3. People Revolution
Armed RevolutionIt is obvious that many tried this route and for several reasons we have to admit that the opposition failed miserably. Some factions, especially some ethic groups, are still pursuing this route. It is not an easy task to build the army, arm and train these forces, and maintain the logistic support infrastructure. Also, the military had an advantage because they had been fighting this civil war for more than 40 years and had gained experience and definitely had the advantage over any opposition elements.
Evolution Transition.This is the road we all had hoped would succeed and had been walking for the past 14 years. We now realize that we have been walking in a circle and are back to square one. The May 30th event and the arrest of DASSK demonstrated to the world, especially to us, that this is actually the dead end road.
People RevolutionThis road is what many had hoped for and what many had experienced on several occasions in our recent history. Yet, we failed to appreciate the distinction between a spontaneous event and a well thought out strategy as a means to remove a military dictatorship. This latter route is what SPDC feared most and, in my opinion, is the most feasible and practical route to get rid of SPDC. After 14 years of trying, this is the route that DASSK appears to have finally accepted. If one listens to last few speeches of DASSK, she had started to guide her followers and the people for confrontation, which is the start of the people demonstrations that will end with Peoples’ revolution.
The relationship between the people and government of Burma and its military rulers is just like the natural earthquake process. When two tectonic plates push at each other, enormous pressure is being built and when they are released we have an earthquake. After the destruction the plates push at each other again and we wait for the next release of pressure and another earthquake. Earthquakes are unpredictable but it is an accepted scientific fact that guarantees another occurrence years later. Similarly, the military suppression is creating the pressure within the people, and the hatred against the military rulers grows with every passing day. Occasionally there have been outbursts during the 40 years rule of the military: 1962 Students demonstrations; 1974 U Thant Uprising; 1975 Mhine Anniversary; and finally, the 1988 National uprising are very good examples. The real sad part is that these uprisings needed years to build up the pressure and when they happened, they happened in a spontaneous manner and there was no strategic plan of action to guide these uprisings to final victory.
We are not unique. If we observe at the current events around the globe, mass demonstration and people uprising in Iran and Venezuela are similar situations that failed to achieve the final goal because there are no defined political movements/leadership that can guide these countries to the final victory. Like us, they may have missed their golden opportunities to victory. At the same time, there are rare but precious victories of national uprisings employing people power. The Philippines and Yugoslav (Serbia) victories are good examples. We must learn and take lessons from these successes.
In the Philippines, there was a symbol, Cory Aquino, the tragic death of a hero (Senator Aquino), the hated dictator, and finally, some factions within the army sided with the people and People Power was achieved. The key factor of success in the Philippine was that the symbol of Cory Aquino and hatred for the dictator attracted the common people, and that attraction gave HOPE to the opposition, and this HOPE finally resulted in the army refusal to support the failing dictatorship. We have all the same ingredients in Burma today. We have a symbol and a hero, DASSK to attract the common people. We have a very much-hated dictatorship. We just need a spark to start the events that will lead to the National uprising that, in turn, will give HOPE to the opposition. With this HOPE, our ranks will grow and the movement will gain momentum and traction. We will then walk the last mile, together with the people to end this forty years reign of terror.Yugoslav example is a somewhat different but very interesting. In Yugoslavia, there was not a single hero. Three elements that are parallel to Burma’s situation pushed the Opposition to victory.
Optor – Student-based political movement.Twenty students from Belgrade University founded “Otpor”, Serbian for “Resistance” in the autumn of 1998, when Serbian law gave government appointees the power to hire or fire university faculty members and required professors to sign an oath of loyalty to the state.Optor soon expanded beyond university grounds, leading a “March to Democracy” between Belgrade and Northern city of Novi Sad. In his Oct 11, 2000 report, Steve Nettleton, CNN.com correspondent in Yugoslavia quoted Jovan Ratkoniv, one of the founders of Optor as follows: “We came from all different faculties. It was chaotic at first: We didn’t have a common strategy. But in the end we just clicked”. Steve went on to report that through a series of media stunts ridiculing the Yugoslav ruler and his policies, Optor did what no political party could do—it suggested to the Serbian people that Milosevic was not invincible.
Opposition UnitesOvercoming years of divisive squabbling, the Yugoslav opposition formed an 18 party alliance known as ‘Democratic Opposition of Serbia. Vojislav Kostunica, a 56-year-old constitution lawyer was chosen as their presidential candidate.
Miners DefiantWhen Milosevic and his thugs tried to rig the election results (seem familiar?) there was a mass protest and the general strike was called. Miners, once fiercely loyal to Milosevic, stopped work and joined the opposition.
The final PUSH, Uprising (Oct 5, 2000)A Yugoslav constitutional court annulled the election result and said Milosevic should serve out his last year in office and called for new elections for 2001. The opposition rejected the court’s finding and called for the mass rally in the center of Belgrade to back up their demands.
At dawn, convoys of thousands of farmers, miners, and opposition supporters from all over Serbia converged on Belgrade, breaking through police roadblocks. Thousands of opposition supporters clashed with police guarding the parliament building. Tear gas was used extensively by the police and the military were standing by. With streaming eyes and choking throats, protesters were temporarily dispersed, but thousands more continued to flood into the capital. At 1600 hours, the protesters captured Serbia parliament after they surged up the assembly steps, overwhelming the police in front of them. Many policemen handed over their arms and joined the opposition. Opposition forces took control of the State TV station and the new transmission under the banner “New Radio Television Serbia” was first broadcast. Soon Serbia was liberated from Slobodan Milosevic and his thugs.
A capable, determined and efficient Under-Ground leadership led The Serbian resistance movement. UG leadership coordinated all the efforts and worked selflessly with one single goal: to overthrow the hated dictatorship. In other word, there was a quiet but united and efficient MOVEMENT that led the events to the desire results.
In her article, ‘Ouster was well-planned uprising”, Danica Kirka, Associated Press writer explained how the seizure of the parliament building seemed to be the act of impulse, seizing the moment to oust Milosevic, but in reality, every step was planned. Some of the groundwork for the tumultuous events that toppled Milosevic had been laid as much as four years earlier.
It is important that we study these successful events and incorporate the best practices
HOPE, UNITY AND FEAR
After destroying all the democratic institutions and legal political parties, Ne Win and his Military Intelligence came down real hard on the opposition. They not only arrested all the opposing politicians and their active followers, they arrested anyone who they deemed to disagreeing with the military rule. They formed the “5 member committee” all over the country and set up the system of informers to report any suspicious activities by anyone. After this reign of terror, many of the opposition forces became weak, and the worst legacy of Ne Win era was that the military instilled fear and suspicion into the whole population of Burma. Many Burmese, who grew up during Ne Win era, are still suspicious of each other. And up to this day the majority of the Burmese have lost ‘HOPE’. Burmese became suspicious of each other and live with fear of the military intelligence. This is their achievement and their victory and we all must fight hard to change this MINDSET.
Within the military, and to some extent within the opposition, Ne Win cleverly used the ‘divide and rule’ policy. Even within his most trusted intelligence community Ne Win instilled competition and mistrust among the key players. Dividing NIB and MI is one of the examples. Within the opposition, MI artfully gave false hope to some opposition leaders that the National Reconciliation between military and the opposition was still possible. Sometime, Ne Win extended the hand for negotiation, like he did to the Communist, not in a good faith but as a political ploy to see the hands of the communist leaders and a chance to instill suspicion among the communist leaders.
When dealing with the political opposition, Ne Win’s methods were well known. He arrested all the key leaders and the supporting followers and put all the others under surveillance.MI harassed all the family members of these opposition sympathizers to the point that the whole families had to struggle just to survive. After 5 and 10 years of detention, when Ne Win felt that his opponents had either lost the following or satisfied that his opponents had lost their potency, Ne Win would released his opponents. For ex-military officers Ne Win would grant some permit to buy a car or offer some privileges so that the grudge against him would be lessen. Ne Win avoided killing, because he did not want to push his opponents to the edge and create bitter enemies. Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint was the rare event where he hanged him as an exemplar so no other officers would dare to plan to stage another coup de’tat against him. PDP agitators were the other exception.
Surprisingly, although Ne Win techniques were like an open book, many still fell for them, even up to the present time. If we carefully follow the actions of the current military rulers, they are still applying the methods and techniques of Ne Win, since the ‘system’ is the creation of Ne Win and they all learned their dirty tricks from the originator. Because times have changed and no country can isolate itself in this present age of Globalization, like Ne Win did during the Cold War days, SLORC and SPDC did not imprison DASSK until now, but they arrested all the able and capable leaders that could surround her or could help her build the necessary political infrastructure to effectively opposed the military dictatorship. All these NLD leaders, potential leaders, student leaders and heroes of the 1988 uprising like Min Ko Naing are still suffering in Burmese prisons. Now and then, they pretend to be planning for the smooth transfer of power, or talk more of National Reconciliation and gave false hopes to the opposition. Some still fall for the same old trick and some thought they would have a place in the future government, and unbelievably some are still hoping and pushing for reconciliation talks. These false hopes are design to achieve two goals: To buy time for the military rule, and to divide the opposition.
Many Burmese unknowingly or knowingly are still carrying this baggage of mistrust, hopelessness, and fear. This is the critical and opportune time to get rid of this BAGGAGE, and the false MINDSET that was imposed upon many Burmese by the Burmese military.
It is time to UNITE, offer HOPE to the Burmese people, and turn around the FEAR for SPDC.
Much easier said than done.Then how shall we do it?
(1) UNITY
The first step is to form a ‘UNITY’.That is what is currently developing among the opposition elements.The first mindset the opposition needs to change is not to form alliances on ‘PERSONALITY’. Many Burmese like to say that ‘Poke-ko-khin-ma’,ta-yar-min’, basically it is the singer not the song. Personality should not be an issue. Why? If Maung Ba cannot work together or cooperate with Maung Hla, then Maung Ba should work together with Maung Mya.
There are 2 setbacks when we put our personality issues in front of our goals. There is only 24 hours in a day and if Maung Ba spent an hour attacking Maung Hla and in return Maung Hla spends an hour responding back, we are losing our efforts doubly in focusing our energy towards attacking our common and major enemy of the Burmese people, the military dictatorship.
We only need a Presentable Unity in the first place to give hope to the Burmese people and to our Democratic friends, that we in the opposition is getting serious to form a UNITY among its elements.
From Presentable UNITY, we need to progress and form a FUNCTIONAL UNITY, which means we can set aside our personal differences and can functionally work together to get rid of the military dictatorship.
If we can reach to this stage we will give a glimpse of HOPE to the Burmese people and the Western observers that we are serious in opposing the military government. And SPDC will surely notice that they now have a formidable opposition at hand.
If we focus on the big picture and do not lose sight of our goal, we can help form a WORKABLE UNITED FRONT.
Imprisonment of DASSK can and shall be the glue to form a UNITY.
(2) Multi-front MOVEMENT
It is an open secret that many UG cells are forming inside Burma. OWay has declared their formation and there are many individual cells that are forming inside Burma. With global SANCTIONS being applied upon SPDC, many opportunities for SPDC and its opportunist friends will cease to exist. More corruption and more suppression will follow since the military cannot give up an inch of ‘control’. The military will circle the wagons and day-by-day the ‘CIRCLE’ will get smaller and smaller. This will create more suffering and more resistance will follow and the RESISTANCE FORCES within the country will grow larger and larger.
If the United Front leaders can get connected with these Resistance Forces within the country, multi-front Movement will be born.
(3) The goal of the MOVEMENT
The focus and goal of this movement is to create another “NATIONAL UPRISING” like 1988 Uprising.All of the opposing elements must become “instigators”.
(4) Instigating from the airwave.
Before the 1988 Uprising, BBC played a major role in instigating the population inside Burma. We now have DVB, RFA in addition to BBC.External Movement leaders must set the united strategy to utilize these broadcasting media to give HOPE to the Burmese people and send INSTIGATING MESSAGES to ENERGIZE the Burmese people.The Opposition should study how a LA based Iranian TV station galvanized and mobilized the IRANIAN mass demonstration.The Opposition should recruit capable writers who can instigate and mobilize and excite the Burmese audience inside Burma.
(5) Professional Instigators
Opposition forces must train “Professional Instigators” and send them inside to organize, plan and instigate mass demonstrations. If we look just back to our current history, there were freedom fighters that successfully started mass demonstrations. Both U Thant and Mhine uprisings were ignited by one talented instigator, Tin Maung Oo from PDP, a hero who was later hanged by Ne Win thugs. When Ne Win denied the proper burial place for U Thant and the students organized the march to Kyaikasan field, the goal was just to demonstrate the dissatisfaction of the country situation and the military suppression. Student leaders did not have a plan to seize the body and start the uprising. Just as the students were gathering around the body and enough mass had entered Kyaikasan, a young leader took the microphones and gave a speech that ignites the event. He then disappeared into the crowd. Again, he was responsible for the Mhine uprising six months later. He was the freedom fighter turned professional instigator who successfully started 2 uprising against Ne Win thugs. He was a hero. Ne Win thugs later hanged him mercilessly. He fought all the way to the gallows streaming, shouting and cursing the military thugs.
There is a saying that amateurs talked about tactics, professionals talked about logistics.We must start thinking about logistics, forming support cells, logistics cells to support these professional instigators, infiltrators and organizers.
(6) Driving for United Nations SANCTIONS
Before the arrest of DASSK most of the Western Nations set their SANCTION policies toward Burma just to support DASSK’s request for SANCTIONS. Implementation was not real strict and there are many loop holes in their rules.
After Depayin, the Western Democracies implemented strict SANCTION rules that cover financial transaction in addition to Trade sanctions. U.S. SANCTION laws are surely starting to hurt because major banks are not allowed to perform transaction with Burma. Major ASEAN players like Singapore and Malaysia are starting to turn against these Burmese generals. At this present time, only Thailand and China are standing behind SPDC. If the opposition leaders can drive the Western policy makers to take the Burma issue to United Nation Security council and if UN Security Council decides to implement the SANCTION REGIME, even China and naturally Thailand must obey to the UN SANCTION RULES. (By exercising its veto power in the UN Security Council, China could prevent UN action against Burma.)
Attacking DASSK at Depayin was a spectacular miscalculation by the SPDC generals. Until this incident, Burma’s problems were viewed as internal issues that did not warrant international attention, especially in this present day climate where the major powers are occupied with Iraq, Iran, North Korea and African civil wars.
We all had to thank the knucklehead hardliners within the SPDC, for we now have the attention of the global key policy makers. We must exploit this opportunity because this may be the last opportunity of our lifetime.
Dictators do not like PRESSURE from hostile Governments. The more they are pressured, the more they will resist. Especially like Than Shwe, who does not have World View, and cannot understand the intricacies of the global diplomatic schemes.
NCGUB should take a leading role with the help of capable opposition leaders and thinkers to think through this issue carefully and set strategy to persuade the Western powers to present our issues at the UN Security Council and take careful steps to lay traps for SPDC.
Thailand and China will support SPDC generals to protect their investments and interests. If the situation in Burma becomes a burden to their relationship with the West and if it starts to hurt their trade and finance they will drop the SPDC generals in a New York minute. China’s 4th generation leaders are more focused on their internal migration and corruption issues and are less hostile to the Western powers than the 3rd generation leaders. Especially, when they are still trying to build their support system within China, they will be less likely to take risks on external issues. Combining the western pressure and acceptance of UN Sanctions, China leaders can be persuaded. WTO is another venue to think about. If ASEAN growth is slowed and ASEAN relationship with EU and US is hurt because of the stubbornness of the SPDC leaders, Thailand will become a lone voice of support for SPDC in the ASEAN. Just to throw some more political bombs into the SDPC camp, during these critical times, NCGUB should make more noise in replacing SPDC at the UN. Once Burma becomes a UN sponsored issue, the opposition can lobby to create UN sponsored International Criminal Court, in the fashion of Serbia and Rawanda, which will further isolate the Burmese military thugs. .
Once China and Thailand support is diminished and if UN becomes involved, South Asian countries support will slowly fade away.
(7) Nobel Peace Prize Club
The Noble Peace Prize Club is a very elite and small group. Using DASSK’s status, NCGUB and the Movement leaders should approach these World Leaders to make more noise and demands for the release of DASSK. If SPDC generals cave in to the world pressure and relax her status from imprisonment to house arrest we must demand full release. If she is released, we must demand her free movement to organize around the country, to restart the Unity talks, up to transfer of power. We must keep demanding with perpetual demands to off-balance SPDC regime in the world opinion and at the same time highlight their atrocities. We cannot let go of this major stupidity of SPDC for plotting against DASSK and arresting her.
(8)Eliminating FEAR and reinstalling HOPE
Throughout 40 years of its rule, military and its military intelligence, MI, has established a myth that they are invincible and that it is a super efficient organization. Many Burmese came to fear that if we oppose the military, the MI will eventually find and crush us. The prevailing attitude is that the Burma military is 400,000 strong and it is hopeless to oppose this strong army.
I read somewhere that Hla Min, OSS spokesperson said that the strength of the army is around 325,000 and half of them are deployed for building infrastructure, such as roads, dams and airports. I like to believe this, because they need a large number to back up their support to threaten with size and to instill hopelessness within the opposition. In reality, half of the army is just an employment agency so they can draw support for the survival of its generals. And, of course, to show off their nation building projects.I was fooled like many. I once asked an American senior military officer who has an intimate knowledge of the capabilities of the Burmese army about the reality of Burma army capabilities. His reply was that the Burmese army has some experience and capability up to the regimental level but beyond that they have no clue for integrated warfare using divisional strength and beyond. Then, I realized that we all had been over sold.
Similarly, if we take a good look at the operation of the MI, they seem to be efficient on the surface. But if we look deeply, they rely on two facts: A large network of informers, and absolute power to arrest anyone without restriction. Let me give one example. At one of the national level uprising events, MIS was looking for a certain typewriter that one of the wanted activist was using to type a certain letter. So they went to Bar Street and arrested every professional typist, and questioned them. From that, they set out the dragnet and of course they caught a few and that is how they started their case. It is not that MI agents are super-smart or efficient. The important base is their network of informers. Many of the Burmese know who are the informers but they dare not touch them because of the power of MI. Worst Burmese has lost hope.
If there is UNITY, if there is an Opposition MOVEMENT, followed by UN SANCTIONS, if there is a ray of HOPE, and if the MI informer bodies start to show up in certain neighborhoods, there are many who wanted to take their hands on these informers. From informers, then we move up to their handlers, who are the Sergeants and Corporal of the MI. Then we move up to the officer rank. We are the sea, we are 50 millions strong. They are the fish. If we can connect the dots, connect all the individual anger and desire for revenge, we will be the force. Once we get the PEOPLE FORCE, we can drown these military THUGS.
(9)The SPARK and the final mile
The country is full of ANGER of the most potent kind-- SUPPRESSED ANGER. We only need a SPARK to start the fire, and a MOVEMENT to guide it to the end, once the fire has been started.
National Uprising, like 8-8-88, is what SPDV fears the most.. They still have the ugly images in their head. They can still taste the fear they felt during those chaotic days.
The country lost the opportunity because the leaders could not UNITE and give HOPE to the people. It was a spontaneous event and the activists and the student leaders did not know what direction they should take. They did not know where to turn. And the established political leaders could not form a single voice to guide these forces.
No more. The country has a HOPE now. If there is any uprising at this present time, the people know there is DASSK. They will ask for DASSK.Unlike Iran and Venezuela, we have our undisputed leader.
If we can start, create or ignite an uprising, the victory is CERTAIN.Once NLD can form a transition government and democracy can be established we have reach our final goal and every Burmese will have a role in politics and national reconstruction.
But while DASSK is in prison, we cannot let the momentum die down.We must keep the flame.Let’s UNITE for the country, for Daw Su, for the patriots who gave their lives, for our kids, for our future generations.Let’s build this MOVEMENT.
We must use this National Uprising as a key strategy and build UNITY and the MOVEMENT to create this uprising.
Daw Su has played her role. Now we all need to play our role. DASSK alone cannot win the freedom for the country. We all have to play our role. We, as an entity, a unified movement will create the “FORCE”, and this “Force”, will open the “freedom gate” for us.
Encircling the Enemy
The preference for Mass Demonstrations and eventually a National Uprising to topple the wicked military government does not by any means belittle the other techniques of Non-violent struggle or armed insurrection against the military dictatorship. In this author’s view, it is the most feasible and practical mode for victory. There is a large population inside Burma where people have been suffering for the last 40 years under the yoke of the military and there is enough dissatisfaction and anger. This anger collectively can become a very potent force and weapon to dispose these military thugs. The weapon is there, if only the opposition can assemble it. It is in effect, the WMD, Weapon of Mass Demonstration that the opposition has failed to utilize. Nevertheless, armed attacks by various groups, targeted assassination, elimination of informers and their handlers, special operations etc, may be necessary to distract and dislocate the enemy in our efforts to encircle the regime. If violence is necessary, we must accept that it may weaken our movement, but it cannot be ruled out. All the targets must be strictly military personnel.
Conclusion
It is an opportune moment for the opposition to get together, form a united front and set definite strategies to change the political system in Burma. It is a well-know fact that it is very hard to get unity among the opposition. SPDC and its military thugs have committed a monumental blunder by cracking down on DASSK. It has captured the attention of the world leaders and they are implementing severe SANCTIONS that will have profound effects inside Burma. No doubt, our fellow citizens will have to bear the brunt of this suffering. There will be many lost jobs, less opportunities, and shortages. With or without these sanctions, our people have been suffering for more than 40 years from the rule of these military thugs. With sanctions pressuring SPDC from outside, we need to create equal pressure from inside. We must highlight the root cause of these SANCTIONS, the main culprit, and convert these suffering victims to anger, connect the dots and channel the anger towards the creation of collective force of the people.
Effects of these latest SANCTIONS are starting to materialize. The opposition has a small window left to get unity and start the united efforts to turn these events to final victory. We missed the opportunity in May when DASSK was attacked by the thugs. There should have been big uproar and mass demonstrations. We missed the opportunity when the military failed to transfer the power to duly elected representatives. We could not and should not afford to miss any more opportunities presented to us by these military dictators. We must start to lay the groundwork with clear goal to meet the target of removing these military goons from Burma. So let’s stop talking gibberish about factions and personalities and tactics and let’s start organizing into small groups, with clearly defined responsibilities and targeted milestones and dates. It is quite a tall order and a challenge to get the unity and start a movement. But who is going to do it if we are not going to step up to the challenges and fulfill our obligation. After all, it is our country and it is our people. Otherwise we all will become the perpetual slave of the military for generations to come.Friends, countrymen, patriots, it is our duty to stop this dictatorship and we must do it.Let’s get united and send the clear message to our people and the military thugs. We had enough and we will fight for our country and our people.Let open the freedom gate, together
Long lives BURMA
Bo Bo Kyaw Nyein
U Kyaw Nyein at 1936 strike
varsity boycotter
U Kyaw Nyein welcoming Thai Leader
Daw Nwe Nwe Yi receiving order of White Elephant 2rd class From Thai Prime Minister Pibun
U Kyaw Nyein, wife Daw Nwe Nwe Yi and Prime Minister Chou in Peking
U Kyaw Nyein during 1936 Student strike at HQ
Aung San AtLee In London
U Kyaw Nyein On Europe Military Mission with General Kyaw Zaw
ေခတ္သစ္ဓာတ္ပံုမ်ား
ဓါတ္ပံုမ်ား
U Kyaw Nyein welcoming Thai Leader
Daw Nwe Nwe Yi receiving order of White Elephant 2rd class From Thai Prime Minister Pibun
U Kyaw Nyein, wife Daw Nwe Nwe Yi and Prime Minister Chou in Peking
U Kyaw Nyein during 1936 Student strike at HQ
Aung San AtLee In London
U Kyaw Nyein On Europe Military Mission with General Kyaw Zaw
